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Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?
Lee Taft*

I. INTRODUCTION

Everyone makes mistakes. Being fallible is a part of being human, an
anthropological fact that links all humans regardless of race, ethnicity, or
culture.' As children we learn that there are procedures to follow in the
wake of error, pathways that invite us to look at the harm we have caused,
amend for the injuries we have inflicted, and, in so risking, create
opportunities for forgiveness and reconciliation. As we age, it becomes
more difficult to acknowledge harms caused because, in part, we have
gained the maturity and insight to recognize what it means to be a, and
sometimes, the cause of another's suffering. Yet, it is not only the
experience of contributing to another's suffering that prompts us to distance
ourselves from admitting wrongdoing: we are also afraid of the
consequences that truth-telling sometimes demands. This is why authentic
adult expressions of remorse are rare. When the discourse of mistake and
accountability is translated into the modem medical environment, where the
consequence of mistake can be patient death or disability with attendant
legal liability, the stakes rise dramatically. This is why physicians often
choose silence when struggling between truth and fear.
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (1OM) published a now well-known
study called To Err is Human.2 According to this study, patient deaths from
* Lee Taft, J.D., M. Div., is an ethicist who provides solutions for businesses, organizations,
and individuals facing crisis in the wake of error by focusing on litigation strategies, client
objectives, and the ethical opportunities crisis offers. Mr. Taft is grateful to Professor Ellen
Smith Pryor for her intellectual support and guidance without which this essay would have
languished. He would also like to acknowledge the scholars who continue to explore the
interdisciplinary dimensions of apology; their work continues to be critical to the evolution
of the author's thinking on this fascinating and important topic. Finally, the author would
like to thank the Annals of Health Law editors, especially Valerie Witmer, for insightful
comments and editorial guidance. Mr. Taft can be contacted at leetaft@earthlink.net.
1. Of course, rituals and discourse regarding amends are culturally dependent. This
essay addresses the process in the western world, more particularly, the United States.
2. INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., Nat'l Acad. Press 1999), available at http://www.iom.edu/Object.file/
master/4/117/0.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) [hereinafter IOM].
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medical errors were occurring at the shocking rate of between 44,000 and
98,000 deaths per year in the United States. While these numbers have
been contested, there is no doubt that large numbers of patients die from
medical mistakes each year. Patient mortality from medical mistakes
accounts for more deaths each year than from motor vehicle crashes, breast
cancer, or AIDS. 4
The economic costs tied to preventable medical errors are also enormous.
According to the 1OM report, the costs associated with such errors hover
between $17 billion and $29 billion.' Half of these costs are attributable to
balance to lost income, loss of household
ameliorative health care, and the
6
production, and disability costs.
The 1OM report proved to be a catalyst for change within the health care
industry. In 2001, the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAHO) published new patient safety standards, including a regulation
requiring disclosure of unanticipated outcomes. The new standard, as
published in the 2004 Hospital Accreditation Standards, reads: "[p]atients
and, when appropriate, their families are informed about the outcomes of
care, treatment, and services, including unanticipated outcomes."8 When
questions arose regarding the breadth of the requirement, "JCAHO...
clarified that accredited organizations must tell patients when harms occur
to them in the course of treatment." 9 Today, disclosure of harmful
outcomes is understood not only as a regulatory requirement, but also as an
ethical obligation. 1°
Currently, the subject of disclosure is a hot topic leading hospitals and
health care institutions to create committees, or charge those already in
existence, with the task of drafting policies and procedures to address the
disclosure of adverse events. An emerging issue within the conversation
around disclosure is the use of apology in communicating unanticipated
outcomes. Consultants are increasingly in demand for seminars on how to

3. Id. at 26.
4. Id. See also Lawrence Gostin, A Public Health Approach to Reducing Error, 283
JAMA 1742, 1742 (2000).
5. IOM, supra note 2, at 27.
6. Id.; Leslie Werstein Hann, Safety Measures,BEST'S REVIEW, Aug. 2000, at 38.
7.
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ACCREDITATION
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HEALTHCARE

ORGS.,

HOSPITAL

(2001), Standard RI.1.2.2 [hereinafter JCAHO I].
standard was renumbered so that in 2004 it is identified as Standard RI.2.90.
ACCREDITATION STANDARDS
8.
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ACCREDITATION STANDARDS (2004), Standard RI.2.90 [hereinafter JCAHO II].
9. Rae M. Lamb et al., HospitalDisclosure Practices: Results of a National Survey, 22
HEALTH AFFAIRS 73, 74 (2003).
10.

Am. SOC'Y FOR HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT., Disclosure: What Works Now & What

Can Work Even Better, MONOGRAPH, Feb. 2004, at 4 [hereinafter ASHRM 1].
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deliver the apology and some medical schools, such as Vanderbilt
University School of Medicine, now require medical students and residents
to take courses designed to address the communication of error through
apology.11 Although currently in vogue, the consideration of apology in the
face of medical error is not new.
In 1986, American physician and writer David Hilfiker highlighted the
tension between mistake and confession in a candid and poignant essay
entitled Mistakes.12 In his essay, he describes errors he made while working
in a small town in Minnesota-mistakes that made the difference between
life and death for some of his patients. 13 Hilfiker recognizes the
inevitability and ubiquity of mistakes as an inescapable part of the human
experience and sees a pedagogical and redemptive value in acknowledging
error: "[s]hown our mistakes and forgiven them, we can grow, perhaps in
some small way become better people.' 14
Hilfiker sees that
acknowledgment of mistakes actually invites connection between human
beings, the admission creating "a process, a way we connect with one
another and with our deepest selves."' 15
Hilfiker describes the
interdependency that arises between humans when the person who errs
confesses and invites the person harmed to forgive, a deeply moral process
between the offender and the offended.' 6 There is mutuality in the
multidirectional nature of the process: expression of remorse moving from
the party who injures, thus inviting forgiveness, and, often, forgiveness
granted and extended by the party harmed. It is a process that inspires
humility in the recognition that today it may be me who errs and you who
forgive. Yet tomorrow, it may be your turn to confess and mine to forgive.
After all, we all err.
However, Hilfiker excepts doctors from this process because he believes
the healing dimension heartfelt confession provides the broader population
is not available to physicians. 17 One reason for this physician exception is
Hilfiker's perspective that mistakes in the medical arena are different from
those in the broader culture because "[a] doctor's miscalculation or
oversight can prolong an illness, or cause a permanent disability, or kill a

11. Rachel Zimmerman, Medical Contrition: Doctors' New Tool to Fight Lawsuits:
Saying 'I'm Sorry, 'WALL ST. J., May 18, 2004, at Al.
12. See David Hilfiker, Mistakes, in ON DOCTORING 325-36 (R. Reynolds & J. Stone
eds., 3d ed. 2001).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 328.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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patient."' 8 Another factor which Hilfiker believes impedes real confession
is an expectation of perfection, arising from unrealistic views generated not
only within the medical community itself, but also from the broader, outside
society, especially patients and their lawyers. 9 The consequence is what
Hilfiker describes as an "intolerable dilemma," a situation in which
physicians "see the horror of [their] mistakes yet ...cannot deal with their
enormous emotional impact., 20 He concludes that while some "emotionally
mature" physicians may disclose facts of what happened, rarely are such
disclosures accompanied by "real confession,"2 or by what I have
described as authentic apology.22
For more than twenty years, I represented patients and families who had
suffered as a result of medical error and sustained adverse outcomes as a
result of preventable error or what is understood in legal terms as "medical
negligence. 23 In the course of my practice, I interviewed three types of
doctors: physicians offering guidance in case selection, those offering
"expert" testimony, and, of course, the treating physicians. I often
wondered if the doctors who had caused the injury suffered as we all do in
the face of our mistakes. I wondered if they hungered to apologize, just as
my clients hungered to hear the apology. Sometimes, I asked that question
directly to the doctor during deposition. The doctor's lawyer invariably
objected, refusing to allow the doctor to answer.
When one of my physician friends was confronted by a mistake and
called to talk with me about the advice being provided by lawyers and risk
managers, I learned that the urge to express sorrow in the face of error was
as strong in a medical environment as in any other. Yet, the moral
inclination was systemically interrupted. My friend was instructed never to
admit mistake, acknowledge error, or apologize in a way that his words
could be construed as an admission of wrongdoing. The heartfelt desire to
amend the wrong was ignored and the doctor's own suffering was not
considered. Instead, the physician was left in the untenable situation
Hilfiker described, caught in an "intolerable dilemma" where the physician
was completely aware of the error and its effects, yet shackled and silenced
18. Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 328.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 335.
21. Id.
22. Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135,
1139-42 (2000).
23. This is different from a mere mistake in judgment; this is the legal standard required
to impose civil responsibility, a standard that in lay terms means that in order to prevail, the
injured patient (or the deceased patient's family) must establish that the physician failed to
render that degree of care the patient could reasonably expect from other physicians within
the accused physician's area of expertise.
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by a system and its advisors.24
I write to counter the kind of advice and systemic perceptions that lock a
physician within this "intolerable dilemma., 25 The purpose of this essay is
to explore the healing possibilities of apology in the face of medical
mistake. My thesis is that the authentic expression of remorse should be
given voice, not only because morally and ethically it is the right thing to
do, but also because it is potentially spiritually healing for both the patient
and the physician. I will demonstrate that when cast into a legal arena, the
authentic expression of remorse carries additional practical benefits that
outweigh the real and presumed risks that lead lawyers, risk managers, and
insurers to give advice like that provided to my friend. Hopefully, proof of
the moral and practical dimensions of authentic apology will inspire
physicians and others in the health care industry to think more critically in
the face of advice that interrupts their moral inclinations and garner
26
sufficient courage to "bring medical mistakes out of the closet.,
The recent requirement by JCAHO that patients be advised of all
unanticipated outcomes, whether positive or negative, presents an
opportunity for precisely the kind of moral conversations this essay seeks to
address. Yet, an examination of the tenor of the conversations surrounding
disclosures suggests that the opportunity before the industry may be lost
because of misunderstandings about what constitutes a real apology. I
begin my analysis in Part II by identifying the philosophical shifts regarding
physician-patient communication that support systemic change. In Part III,
I describe what I mean by authentic apology and outline its place within the
moral dialectic between harm and reconciliation. In Part IV, I examine how
different models for the disclosure of unanticipated outcomes suggest that
error should be communicated and demonstrate the potential for harm when
apology is appropriated as a communication strategy rather than understood
as an integral part of a larger moral conversation. In Part V, I analyze the
legal implications of disclosure and outline legislative trends intended to
disconnect disclosure from legal consequences and conclude that it is fear
that interrupts the physician's moral inclination to fully disclose. To
counter this fear, I offer evidence of the practical benefits of authentic
apology in quantitative terms in Part VI.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL SHIFTS IN PHYSICIAN-PATIENT COMMUNICATION
The 1999 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, while shocking
statistically, energized the conversation already taking place within the
24.

Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 335.

25.
26.

See id. at 336.
Id.
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medical community regarding patient welfare, patient safety, and patient
rights. There were immediate responses to the IOM report, including the
2001 Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospital Organizations
(JCAHO) requirement that all unanticipated outcomes be communicated to
patients or their families.27 This type of disclosure was not frequently
addressed before the JCAHO regulation made the disclosure of
unanticipated outcomes an industry standard.2 8 Now, the requirement for
the disclosure of unanticipated outcomes is unequivocally established as
29
both an ethical and regulatory expectation for both physicians and nurses.
The expectation for such disclosure is addressed in the opinions of such
standard bearers as the American Medical Association, the American
30
These
College of Physicians, and the American Nurses Association.
a
recent
than
deeper
something
reflect
movements
regulatory and ethical
trend in patient care; they reveal a philosophical shift in the very nature of
communication between patient and care provider.
The traditional relationship between patient and doctor was hierarchal.
Knowledge, information, and the power of decision rested primarily with
the physician. In this kind of system, "communication[s] with patients
[were] taken for granted, the assumption being that health care providers
would decide what was appropriate for patients and families to know. 3 1 It
was a culture in which the health care provider "assumed the right to decide
what was good for the patient, both in terms of action (which treatment to
accept) and in terms of the effect of the information (what information to
withhold) .... ,3 2 This is the system within which Hilfiker was working in
the 1980s, a culture that contributed to a tragic mistake he details in his
essay.
One of Hilfiker's patients was Barb Daily.33 She and her husband, Russ,
became friends of Hilfiker's after he delivered their first child.34 When
Barb returned because she believed that she was pregnant with her second
child, Hilfiker examined her.35 Although she presented with many
symptoms of an early pregnancy, her urine test was negative.36 The test
27.

JCAHO I, supra note 7, at Standard RI.1.2.2.

28.

AM. SOC'Y OF HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT., Disclosure of UnanticipatedEvents: The

Next Step in Better Communication With Patients, MONOGRAPH,

May 2003,

at 10

[hereinafter ASHRM II].
29. See Lamb et al., supra note 9, at 73.
30. Id. at 82.
31.

See ASHRM I, supra note 10, at 4.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 325.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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remained negative over the summer and Hilfiker finally concluded that
Barb had experienced a "missed abortion" and recommended a dilation and
curettage (D & C). 37 On the day of the procedure, Hilfiker examined Barb
again and, in spite of her uterus feeling bigger than it had two days earlier,
he still performed the procedure. 38 During the operation, he realized that it
was not the expected bits of decomposing tissue
he was removing, but
39
rather "parts of a body that was recently alive!,
In the frantic calls he made post-surgically, no one was able to explain
how a woman in Barb's condition could have had four consecutive negative
pregnancy tests.40 Hilfiker was left with the hideous task of describing
what he did and why he did it.4 1 When Russ asked if an ultrasound
examination would have prevented the mistake, Hilfiker acknowledged that
it would have. 2 However, in his essay,'4 3Hilfiker laments that he could not
"explain why [he] didn't recommend it."
Hilfiker had considered the test. 44 He knew that by ordering it he would
know for sure whether or not Barb was pregnant.45 He decided against it
partly because the test was not immediately available in the rural town
where Hilfiker practiced.46 However, the primary reason he decided not to
offer it as a treatment option was the expense of the procedure.4 7 He said,
"I know the Dailys well enough to know they have a modest income, ' 48 a
comment which suggested that Hilfiker thought the cost of the test
prohibitive for the Dailys.
It is not clear from his essay whether Hilfiker ever realized that his most
serious mistake was not in performing the surgery, but was, rather, his selfdetermination that the Dailys could not afford a test that would have saved
their child's life.
While this decision spared the Dailys from the
complexities of choice, it overlooked their agency and resourcefulness. As
a result, he denied his patients the opportunity to participate in a decision
critical to their child's care. However, Hilfiker is not to be criticized for
this. He was operating within a philosophical framework that encouraged

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.at 326-27.
Id.
Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 327.
Id. at 327-28.
Id. at 328.
Id.
See id.
Id.at 325-26.
Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 325-26.
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id.
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and supported such a patriarchal approach. This is a framework that over
the past decade has been evolving away from doctor-based decision-making
to a more patient-centered approach. A study of recent commentaries on
communications to patients regarding unanticipated outcomes illustrates
this trend.
Unlike the Dailys, patients today are no longer seen as passive recipients
of a doctor's decision of what is good for them. Patients are now seen as
independent agents, "full partners in their health care. '4 9 The American
Society for Healthcare Risk Management (ASHRM) describes the agency
now seen in patients in terms even stronger than that of partner when they
declare that "the patient is now recognized as the arbiter of how
information that pertains to them should be conveyed and used. 50 In order
to fulfill this role, patients must be fully informed of all relevant facts about
their care. 51 This necessitates "[o]pen and ongoing communication with
patients about their care ....

,,52

The required communication covers

outcomes of all care, including an unanticipated outcome defined as "a
result that differs significantly from what was anticipated to be the result of
a treatment or procedure. 53 An unanticipated outcome can be positive,
54
,
negative, or neutral and "may or may not be associated with... error.
Given this article's focus on apology, my analysis will focus on adverse
unanticipated outcomes associated with error, and the role apology plays in
communicating error to patients. 55
III. APOLOGY WITHIN A MORAL DIALECTIC

In 1999, when I first addressed apology and its role in the legal arena, I
wrote against the backdrop of President William Clinton's apology in the
Monica Lewinsky scandal. The expressions of contrition were so frequent
then that one pundit described the atmosphere pervading the culture as
"apology mania.",56 Five years later, the "mania" continues as we again
witness extraordinary expressions of remorse by our President and
Secretary of Defense in the wake of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners in our care.
Apologies also are rampant in the medical arena as evidenced in a recent
49.

See MINN. Hosp. ASS'N, Communicating Outcomes to Patients2 (2002).

50. ASHRM I, supra note 10, at 4 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 5; MINN. Hosp. Ass'N, supra note 49, at 2.
52. MiNN. HosP. Ass'N, supra note 49, at 2.
53. See JCAHO II, supra note 8, at Standard RI.2.90.
supra note 49, at 2.
54. MiNN. HosP. ASS'N, supranote 49, at 2.

55.

See also MINN. HosP. Ass'N,

Id. at 3.

56. Barbara Amiel, Saying Sorry is Fine, But Only to a Point, MACLEAN'S, May 25,
1998, at 11.
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Wall Street Journal article lauding apologies in the face of medical
mistakes and highlighting their beneficial effect in reducing liability. 7 In
that article, a surgeon who teaches seminars for doctors and malpractice
insurers on the importance of apology, states that "nothing is more effective
in reducing liability than an authentically offered apology. 5 8 Yet, what is
missing from this article, as well as from the national conversation about
apology, is a thoughtful analysis of what defines authentic apology.
Nicholas Tavuchis, a sociologist who has written a detailed text on the
subject of apology and reconciliation, believes that "[w]hatever else is said
or conveyed, an apology must express sorrow."5 9 Yet, sorrow in this
context means something more than an expression of sympathy or regret.
"In the context of apologetic discourse, the expression of sorrow is equated
with feelings of remorse, shame, and repentance. 6 ° In fact, an authentic
apology is the voice of repentance, another nuanced and complex term.
There is no agreed upon definition of civic repentance in our culture.
Perhaps the word that most closely approximates its meaning is
rehabilitation, where one is restored to good health or a useful life. 6' In
religious language, repentance "unites two linguistic and theological
traditions. 62 It combines the Greek "metanoia" with the Hebrew "shub. 63
Metanoia suggests a fundamental change of mind just as metamorphosis
suggests a fundamental change in form.64 Shub is a Hebrew root word
meaning "to turn" or "to return," as in turning away from wrong conduct
and returning to right pathways.6 5 Broken into component parts, the
elements of true repentance are remorse, apology, restitution, and a
restructuring of life.
In the face of medical error, the physician must first take time to identify
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See Zimmerman, supra note 11, at Al.
Id.
NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA 36 (Stanford Univ. Press, 1991).
Taft, supra note 22, at 1139.
REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 7 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney
eds., 1997); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1172 (Houghton Mifflin Co.
1993).
62. Malcolm David Eckel, A Buddhist Approach to Repentance, in REPENTANCE: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 129 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997) (citing
THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, 978 (Gerhard Kittel ed., 1967)).
63. Id.See also THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, supra note 62, at
978, 984.
64. Eckel, supra note 62, at 129; THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT,
supra note 62, at 978.
65. BROWN-DRIVER-BRIGGS HEBREW AND ENGLISH LEXICON 996 (Francis Brown et al.
eds., 1996); NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY & EXEGESIS

55 (Willem A. VanGemeren ed., 1997); THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT,
supra note 62, at 984.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2005

9

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 14

what went wrong and why, a process that must take place before
communicating with the patient or the patient's family. This is a time not
only for internal reflection but also a time for communication with the
medical team, mentors, and colleagues.
This is a difficult process,
especially when one recalls the burden of professionalism that Hilfiker
described, how one's professional reputation itself seems to be at stake.66
To fully appreciate this difficulty, we can recall Hilfiker's agony when he
realized that he was removing parts of a body that had been recently alive,
not the expected decomposing tissue of a missed abortion. 67 The humility
required for him to place the call and tell another physician of the mistake
he made is unimaginable. While this is an incredibly difficult starting
place, it is a critical step in apologetic discourse. It equips the physician to
communicate with clarity, and, if a norm or standard was violated, it allows
space for the doctor to experience the remorse that can gird and support the
courage required to take the next step-the communication of the error
through authentic apology.
According to Tavuchis, for an apology to be authentic, it must follow a
precise formula whereby the party offering the apology: (1) acknowledges
through speech the legitimacy of the violated rule; (2) admits fault for its
violation; and (3) expresses genuine remorse and regret for the harm caused
by the violation.6 8 While some suggest that at this stage there should also
be an explicit offer of restitution and/or promise to reform, 69 Tavuchis
believes that these additional elements are implicit in the apology's
authentic expression. 70 For him, the expression of regret coupled with the
admission of fault itself implies a willingness to change, a promise of
forbearance, and an implicit agreement to accept all the consequencessocial, legal, or otherwise-that flow from having committed the wrongful
act. 71 This is the apology that seemed almost unimaginable to Hilfiker: "a
real confession" where the doctor comes to the injured patient and

66.

Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 328-29.

67. Id. at 327.
68. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 59, at 3.
69. Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into
Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 221, 239 (1999);
Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize?
Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC REs. 127, 138
(1997); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture
in Japan and the UnitedStates, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 461, 469-70 (1986).
70. TAVUCHIS, supranote 59, at 23.
71. Taft, supra note 22, at 1140. In the context of the disclosure of harmful,
unanticipated outcomes, an explicit offer of restitution/reparation is critical. See discussion
infra Part VI.
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forthrightly says, "This is the mistake I made; I'm sorry."72
The "real confession" illustrates that apologetic discourse is a moral
activity because it recognizes the existence of a norm and that the breaking
of the norm has caused harm. Moreover, apologetic discourse demands
great courage from the party who has erred because he must not only
acknowledge wrongdoing, but also subject himself to the consequences that
flow from the admission, including the risk of litigation. When the courage
of the act is thought of in this light, it becomes clear that an "authentic
apology is itself a moral action regardless of its efficacy. 73 There is
integrity in acknowledging wrongdoing and voluntarily subjecting oneself
74
to the consequences, regardless of the injured party's response.
The process of forgiveness provides another significant explanation of
the morality of apology and reveals another dimension of its healing
capabilities. Hilfiker speaks of this potential when he notes that "the only
' 75
way to face our guilt is through 'confession, restitution, and absolution.'
He identifies, in shorthand form, the process of forgiveness. 76 This process
begins with the occurrence of an event that triggers repentance, which in its
authentic expression invites forgiveness, 77
which is the door to reconciliation.
Illustration of the process looks like this:
EVENT

.4k

RECONCILIATION

REPENTANCE
J,'

FORGIVENESS

72.

Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 335-36.

73.
74.
75.

Taft, supra note 22, at 1142.
Id.
Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 335.

76. Id.
77. This diagram demonstrates that initially the movement toward reconciliation begins
with the event and moves toward and through the physician in the process of repentance.
Authentically performed and communicated, repentance can inspire forgiveness, which is
itself multidirectional. To be granted only by the injured party, forgiveness moves in one
direction back to the party causing harm and in the other direction, it opens the door to
reconciliation. With reconciliation complete, the original event while not erased is reframed. The circles around each step in this process are intended to communicate that a
process occurs within each critical moment in this cycle of healing. The overall arrangement
is intended to communicate the relational nature of the dialectic.
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As the voice of repentance, an authentic apology becomes the "middle
term in a moral syllogism," itself a moral action inviting forgiveness as a
moral option for the injured party. 8 Authentic apology then is the
centerpiece in a moral dialectic between remorse and forgiveness. 79 There
is a promise within this dialectic, one that states that authentic repentance
swings wide the door of forgiveness. This is a fact recognized in the
emerging science of forgiveness, where psychologists have discovered that
one of the most significant factors influencing the granting of forgiveness is
repentance by the party who has erred.8 ° Apology does not exist in
isolation; rather, it is an intensely relational process. g It begins as a
singular experience with feelings of remorse yet in its expression, it
becomes unquestionably dyadic. It "cannot be understood alone any more
than could a promise be understood without reference to a promisor and
promisee. ,,82 In Hilfiker's terms, it is a confession that invites absolution.838
This insight establishes that authentic apology has the capacity to inspire
a unique kind of healing that contains the potential to heal both doctor and
patient. In moral terms, this healing occurs because authentic apology
restores right relationship between the party injured and the party who
caused the injury.84 Undisclosed error interrupts the essential ingredient of
trust between doctor and patient and disrupts the doctor's sense of
integrity. 85 Although the error itself relates to physical harm, the lack of
apology disrupts the moral dimension of the doctor's relationship with the
patient, the broader medical community, and himself. In its authentic
expression, apologetic discourse restores moral balance and an equality of
regard.86 Thus, it is multidirectional in its potential healing capabilities.
But is authentic apology really possible in the modem medical world, or
78.

TAVUCHIS, supra note 59, at 20.

79.

Taft, supra note 22, at 1143.
E.g., Roy F. Baumeister et al., The Victim's Role, Grudge Theory, and Two
Dimensions of Forgiveness, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS 82, 93 (Everett L. Worthington
ed., 1998).
81. Taft, supra note 22, at 1142.
82. Id.at 1142-43.
83. Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 335.
84. See Taft, supra note 22, at 1137 n.9 and accompanying text. Another way to view
this restoration is through the lens of equity theory. Jennifer Robbennolt notes that "[e]quity
theory posits that a transgression by an offender against an injured party results in an
inequity in their relationship; that is, the wrong creates a moral imbalance between the
parties." Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical
Examination, 102 MICH. L. REv. 460, 477 (2003). Under this theory, apology offers one way
to restore moral balance. Id.
85. E.g., Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians'AttitudesRegarding the
Disclosure of Medical Errors,289 JAMA 1001, 1001 (2003).
86. Taft, supra note 22, at 1137.
80.
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does Hilfiker have it right when he notes that "within the structure of
modem medicine there is no place for such spiritual healing?, 87 It must be
remembered that Hilfiker was writing before the Institute of Medicine's
(IOM) report and the introduction of new regulatory and ethical
considerations. So while sweeping systemic changes have not yet emerged,
the IOM report and the variety of responses to it have cracked the structure
that existed when Hilfiker was writing. These cracks may be understood
today only as interstices, but, like it or not, the emerging regulations and
ethical mandates inevitably mean that silence can no longer be assumed as a
backdrop.
Yet there exist stumbling blocks, impediments that are both real and
imagined.
Many compelling questions arise: how is apology being
Do the
communicated within the context of disclosure policies?
of the
capture
the
heart
that
are
being
encouraged
expressions of remorse
authentic apology? And what about the legal implications of the kind of
authentic apology outlined here? Would authentic apology not simply add
fuel to the malpractice fire? This essay seeks to answer these questions. In
Part V, I will first illustrate how disclosures are being communicated
through two model disclosure policies. Next, I will show how apology is
being communicated within these disclosure policies and how authentic
apology and expressions of sympathy are being conflated. I will then
demonstrate how this conflation causes confusion in understanding the true
nature of apology and how this confusion ultimately leads to
communications that hurt rather than heal. In Part V, I will examine the
legal risks associated with the kind of apology I have described and, in Part
VI, offer an analysis of the quantitative benefits of authentic apology in
contrast to associated risks. This analysis will support my thesis that
authentic apology should be given voice, not only because of its capacity to
heal, but also because of the practical advantages realized in its expression.
IV. DISCLOSURE: COMMUNICATING UNANTICIPATED OUTCOMES

A. DisclosureModels
The majority of institutions are struggling to implement policies and
procedures to address the requirement for disclosure. While there is general
agreement that the patient should be informed of an unanticipated outcome,
there is much variability in terms of what words should be used in
communicating the event.88 This is especially true when it comes to

87. Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 335.
88.

See MiNN. HOsp. ASS'N, supra note 49, at 2. See also ASHRM I, supra note 10, at
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empathic expressions between physicians and patients. 89 A recent brochure
published by the Minnesota Hospital and Healthcare Partnership (MHHP)
outlines "a model communication policy" that MHHP believes is the "gold
standard communication policy for communicating with patients and
families." 90
The model highlights the modem philosophy of patientcentered medical care and recognizes the patient's right and need to know
about unanticipated outcomes, medical accidents, or near medical
accidents.9 1 The model outlines the specific steps that should be taken
before the actual disclosure is made to the patient and begins with such
preparatory matters as consulting with risk management, considering the
timing of the disclosure, and identifying the persons who should be present
during the disclosure itself (e.g., a second member of the health care team
92
or a patient's representative).
The brochure then outlines the content of
93
the disclosure itself.
According to the model policy, the first thing to be communicatedbefore any factual information is provided about the event itself-is that
"the hospital and its staff regret and apologize that a medical accident has
occurred., 9 4 It is only after this expression that more expected matters are
addressed, such as what happened, the implications of the event,
ameliorative actions taken and to be taken, and plans to compensate the
patient. 95 The model does not specifically define what it means by regret or
apology. However, an issue of Monograph published this year by the
American Society for Health Care Risk Management (ASHRM) does.96
The ASHRM model entitled "Disclosure: What Works Now & What Can
Work Even Better" describes four distinct skills required to ensure an
effective communication: Preparation, Initiation of Conversation,
Conclusion of Conversation, and Documentation.97
The "Initiation of
4-5.
89.
4-5.
90.

See MINN. Hosp. Ass'N, supra note 49, at 2. See also ASHRM I, supra note 10, at
MINN. HosP. ASS'N, supra note 49, at 2.

91. Id.The MHHP document defines an unanticipated outcome as "[a] result that differs
significantly from what was anticipated to be the result of a treatment or procedure." Id.
Medical accident is defined as "[a]n unintended event in the system of care with actual or
potential negative consequences to the patient. Medical accidents can result from defect,
failure and error within the system of care." Id. A "near medical accident" is "[a]n event
that would have constituted a medical accident but was intercepted at the patient care
services before it actually reached the patient." Id.
92. Id. at 3.
93. MINN. Hosp. Ass'N, supra note 49, at 3-4.
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id.
96. ASHRM I, supra note 10, at 8.
97. See id. at 6-11.
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Conversation" section identifies what the Monograph calls the "heart of the
discussion," which means the core elements of what disclosure is to cover
and without which "it is not possible to say that adequate disclosure has
occurred." 98 These core elements are: what happened, where things are
now, next steps, and the requirement that the party disclosing "sincerely
acknowledge the patient/family's suffering." 99
The authors of the ASHRM model note that even though "[e]mpathy
continues to be controversial among risk managers, lawyers and claims
adjustors... [a] well-crafted expression of empathy can both provide the
acknowledgment of suffering and the opportunity for both parties to
heal."' 100 The authors suggest that this "well-crafted acknowledgment" start
with "I'm sorry" or "I feel badly" or "I'm sad that. . ." since "it is what
follows that initial phrase that determines the efficacy and interpretation of
the apology."' 0 ' In a situation where there has been medical error, they
suggest that the physician apologize by saying, "I am so sad that this has
happened. You must be terribly upset, and so am L" 102 In the case of an
unanticipated outcome, they suggest that the apology that would be healing
to both the patient and the physician be communicated like this: "This is sad
and not what
any of us expected. I wish it weren't this way and I know you
10 3
do, too.'

I have tried to imagine how Hilfiker's patients, Barb and Russ Daily,
would have responded to these kinds of "apologies." Recall that the "heart
of the disclosure conversation" that ASHRM recommends begins with a
simple description of what happened, followed by the result of the event,
the next steps, and then the expression of empathy.'0 4 Under these
guidelines, Hilfiker's statement to the Dailys would proceed as follows:
I want you to know what happened in the surgery. As it turned out, you
were carrying a viable fetus and, as a result of the procedure, the fetus
died. You will experience the passage of fetal tissue in the next few
days, and then, physically, you will feel much better. No one has ever
heard of a patient being pregnant in the face of four negative urine tests.
We are trying to cetermine why this happened so that this never occurs
again. I am so sad this has happened. You must be terribly upset, and so
am I.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
ASHRM I, supra note 10, at 8.
Id.
See Id. at 7-8.
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If you were the Dailys, would this "well-crafted expression of sympathy"
provide the opportunity for the healing that the ASHRM Monograph
suggests? Does it matter that this disclosure contains no admission of
wrongdoing and stops short of a real confession? How would you feel
when you learned the reason the ultrasound was not offered? Can healing
occur in the absence of the authentic apology I have described? Can
Hilfiker realize his desire for absolution in the absence of confession?
B. DistinguishingEmpathic Disclosurefrom Authentic Apology
There is, of course, a difference between a disclosure that includes an
expression of sympathy, well-crafted or not, and the authentic apology
described in this essay. The difference is both linguistic and teleological.
Linguistically, the empathic disclosure is more akin to an apologia than it is
to authentic apology. In the modern business environment, apologia is
understood as a communication device employed by those experiencing
crisis in the face of actual or perceived wrongdoing. 10 5 While the rare
apologia may contain an authentic apology, it is primarily a strategic
communication designed not only to convey information, but also, and
perhaps more importantly, to neutralize the potential negative ramifications
that might otherwise result from the information given.10 6 Understood
through a business communications model, apologia is more than a simple
justification of one's position. 10
In7 business parlance, it is a justification
strategy.
defensive
a
with
coupled
Under this expanded understanding, the empathic disclosure is closer to
an apologia than it is to authentic apology. Understanding disclosure this
way shows that while both are communications, there is an important
difference between empathic disclosure and authentic apology. Like
apologia, an empathic disclosure is both explanatory and strategic in that it
seeks to relate critical factual information to the patient in a way designed
to neutralize negative ramifications. The authentic apology is also a
communication but, in its openness to truth, it avoids strategic. and
defensive purposes. This explanation shows that the difference is deeper
than one of semantics; the difference is teleological as well. The purpose of
the disclosure of unanticipated outcomes is to provide patients with
essential information to guide their healthcare decisions.10 8
The
requirements of the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospital
105. Keith Michael Hearit, Apologies and Public Relations Crises at Chrysler, Toshiba,
and Volvo, 20 PUB. RELATIONS REV. 113, 114 (1994).
106. Id. at 115.
107. See id. at 114.
108. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
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Organizations (JCAHO) standard are straightforward: "[p]atients and, when
appropriate, their families are informed about the outcomes of care,
treatment, and services, including unanticipated outcomes."' 0 9 The reason
for this standard, the ultimate end to be served by these disclosures, is to
create a mechanism to ensure that patients are knowledgeable and equipped
to participate "in current and future decisions affecting the patient's care,
treatment, and services."' 1 ° This is more than a response to the 1999 IOM
report; it is a reflection of the previously described philosophical shift
toward patient-centered and directed care. This is the clear purpose and the
telos of both the standard requiring disclosure and the ethical considerations
that are associated with it."'
Apology is much more than a conveyor of information." 12 It is the
centerpiece in a moral dialectic between error and forgiveness."13 Its
purpose is to give voice to repentance through the expression of sorrow and
the admission of wrongdoing. These two elements are essential, so that the
absence of either renders the apology incomplete and interrupts its moral
dimension. In its authentic expression, apology is an invitation to the party
harmed to extend forgiveness and, thus, provide the opportunity for
reconciliation. Its ultimate end is healing for both the party who has
inflicted harm as well as for the one who suffers. 1 4 It is healing for the
party who has erred because the one who risks apology demonstrates moral
courage by speaking a truth that carries potentially grave consequences.'1 5
Yet paradoxically, it is the taking of the risk that also restores one's
116
integrity with the party harmed, with one's self, and with the community.
The receipt of apology sparks healing in the party harmed, not only because
it restores moral balance by demonstrating the regard and care in which the
party harmed is held by the party causing injury, but also because apology
invites the party harmed to extend forgiveness, itself a courageous and

109.

See JCAHO II, supra note 8, at Standard RI.2.90.

110.
111.

See id. at Elements of Performance for RI.2.90.
See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.

112. As I noted in an earlier essay, apology is a performative utterance. See Taft, supra
note 22, at 1139-40. The classic formulation of a performative utterance is that of J.L.
Austin. Austin challenges the philosophical assumption that to state something is simply to
state something. Austin does this by showing that there are times when in saying something
we actually do something as when one says "I do" in a marriage ceremony. J.L. AUSTIN,
HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS, 5 (J.O. Urmson & Monica Sbisa eds., 1975). Austin's

view, one which I share, is that "I apologize" is another paradigmatic performative utterance.
Id. at 79, 146.

113.

See discussion supra p. 66.

114.
115.
116.

See supra pp. 62-66 (discussing apology and its implications).
See supra pp. 62-66 (discussing apology and its implications).
See supra pp. 62-66 (discussing apology and its implications).
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The failure to recognize these linguistic and teleological differences
between empathic disclosure and apology causes confusion and missteps
regarding the design and implementation of policies and procedures
regarding the disclosure of unanticipated outcome within the medical arena.
This occurs when the telos of disclosure is mixed with that of authentic
apology even in thoughtful and well-intentioned policies like those
suggested by MHHP and ASRHM. 18 Combining disclosure with wellcrafted expressions of empathy seems perfectly logical when viewed as a
communication strategy, but the conflation of expressions of empathy with
those of true repentance blurs the telos of the communication. This moral
misstep ultimately exacerbates the very injury that prompted the disclosure.
The new injury may not be at once apparent. The empathic disclosure
may even initially appear efficacious. Yet, when the patient has an
opportunity to reflect and realizes that there was no real accountability, no
real confession, he will feel betrayed, and the temporary alleviation of pain
will evaporate into a deepened sense of abandonment and mistrust. This is
the effect of what psychiatrist Aaron Lazare calls a "botched apology." 119
This is -an apology that not only fails to communicate effectively the
offender's repentance, remorse and regret, but also creates further harm that
can strain relationships and fuel bitter vengeance.120 A recent example that
the Dallas Morning News described as having a "depressingly familiar ring
to it" is illuminating. 121
117.

118.

See supra pp. 62-66 (discussing apology and its implications).
See MINN. Hosp. ASS'N, supra note 49, at 2. See also ASHRM I, supra note 10, at

4-5.
119. Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead and Say You're Sorry, PSYCH. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at
40.
120. What Lazare calls the botched apology Jennifer Robbennolt describes as the partial
apology. Robbennolt, supra note 84, at 469. This is the apology that expresses sympathy
but does not admit responsibility. Id. From her research comparing the partial apology to
the full apology and their respective effects on settlement, Robbennolt concluded that in the
case of serious injury, the full apology positively impacted settlement while the partial
apology "increased the likelihood that the respondent would be unsure how to respond to the
settlement offer." Id. at 486, 491. In the case where there is strong evidence of culpability
coupled with a partial apology, the partial apology was found to be particularly detrimental.
Id. at 497. "When the offender failed to take responsibility in the apology (i.e., offered a
partial apology) for an incident that resulted in severe injury, the degree of responsibility
attributed to the offender was greater and the offer was seen as less likely to make up for the
injury." Id. at 497-98 and accompanying footnotes. This perception also extended to the
element of repentance regarding a restructuring of one's life. Robbennolt found that the
offender who offered the partial apology "was seen as less likely to be careful in the future
than those offering either a full or no apology." Id. at 498. And where responsibility is
clear, Robbennolt concluded that no apology is better than the empathic or botched apology.
Robbenolt, supra note 84, at 498.
121. Lutheran Sex Scandal: $37 Million Verdict Makes a Good Point, DALLAS MORNING
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In April 2004, an east Texas jury awarded $37 million to the plaintiff in a
sexual abuse lawsuit. 22 The plaintiffs in that case demonstrated that the
abuser "had a record of inappropriate behavior with boys and an interest in
pornography," yet the church ordained him anyway. 23 Worse, neither the
24
bishop nor his top assistant told the congregation of the abuser's record.
After the verdict, another bishop, who had replaced the first, offered this
apology to the victims: "[w]e do express our regrets. We pledge to make
sure people like Gerry Thomas [the abuser] never serve a church again."' 25
What made this a "botched apology?" The bishop never acknowledged the
church's wrongdoing, nor did he accept responsibility for the church's
failure and its part in the horror it made possible. Lazare finds this gloss
psychologically predictable and destined to fail because it is not offered to
make amends for an injury inflicted, but rather to manipulate the injured
party's feelings in favor of the party who caused the harm. 126 Yet, the
inclination to avoid the pain of a true confession is also foreseeable since
the admission of wrongdoing collides with values most professionals
embrace, traits such as competency and honesty. 27 As Hilfiker noted,
perfectionism takes its toll. 2 8
The empathic disclosure that admits no wrongdoing is like a "botched
apology." It informs, it expresses regret, but it does not heal. Ultimately, a
disclosure without authentic apology lacks the central element required to
restore moral balance. Without an admission of wrongdoing, it does not
and should not, inspire forgiveness. It is the confession within authentic
apology that invites healing and it is this healing that physicians who err
seek.
If "[v]irtually every practitioner knows the sickening reali[z]ation of
making a bad mistake" and if most desire to confess, then why do they
remain silent? 29 And why do those who advise them continue to encourage
empathic expressions but insist that these communications be constructed
so that they contain no admission of wrongdoing? Of course, the primary
reason advanced is the fear of litigation. 130
Those studying the
NEWS, Apr. 26, 2004, at A16.

122.
123.
124.
125.
A3.
126.
127.
128.
129.
(2000).
130.

Id.
Id.
Id
Lutheran Bishop Apologizes to Victims,

DALLAS MoRNING NEWS,

Apr. 24, 2004, at

Lazare, supra note 119, at 78.
Id.
Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 336.
Albert W. Wu, Medical Error: The Second Victim, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 726, 726
See e.g., Lamb et al., supra note 9, at 76.
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implementation of disclosure policies have concluded that fear of
malpractice litigation is "the most prominent foil to aspirations of
openness." Regardless of whether or not that fear is justified, are we
prepared to say that the fear of litigation, real or perceived, is itself
sufficient justification to excuse physicians from admitting error? There are
many-who argue that it is. 132 Those who view the dilemma this way and see
physicians caught "between the powers and liabilities of apologies"' 133 also
see the law as the culprit and look to legislatures for solutions.
V. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DISCLOSURE

In legal language, an admission is a statement against one's own interest,
and the general rule is that an admission may be considered by judge and
jury.13 4 The rationale for the general rule is that an admission carries
evidentiary value because, in the normal course of human behavior, one
would not make a statement against one's own interest unless the statement
were true. An authentic apology constitutes an admission and, in the event
of litigation, may be considered by the trier of fact.' 35 When authentic
apology is considered within the context of litigation, there is a decided
shift away from moral concerns "to strategic maneuvers and legal
consequences.'36
This shift is encouraged by those advising physicians, especially their
lawyers, insurers and risk managers. In a recent essay, the chair of a
litigation team specializing in health care addressed the issue of
disclosure. 137 Noting the importance of communication with the patient and
the opportunity for strategic advantage, he reminds care providers that
"[w]e need to see that providing the right amount and type of information in
131. Id. at 81.
132. Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S.CAL. L. REv. 1009, 102830 (1999). See Orenstein, supra note 69, at 259-60.
133.

Deborah Tannen, About Last Week... Apologies: What it Means to Say 'Sorry,'

POST, Aug. 23, 1998, at C1.
134. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 801(d) (2004) (providing that a statement made by a party to
the litigation is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, a rule that would normally
exclude statements made out of court).
135. The existence of the traditional view of the evidentiary rule is what propelled the
California legislature to modify it. In the commnnentary to that rule, the bill's sponsor, Judge
Quentin Koop, noted "apologies and similar expressions are admissible as purported
exceptions to the hearsay rule in a trial by court or jury." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (2004
Electronic Update Comment). See also, e.g., Cohen, supra note 132, at 1010.
136. Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1165,
1188 (1997).
137. James W. Saxton & Maggie M. Finklestein, Enhanced Communication to Reduce
Liability, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIG., available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/business/
1103saxton.html (2003).
WASH.
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the right way and by the right people can benefit the patient from a health
38
perspective and the health care provider from a liability perspective."'
According to the author, the "right" way to disclose an unanticipated result
is for the physician to "have a timely discussion with the patient and/or
family in an empathetic
manner, providing an apology, yet certainly without
' 39
admitting liability."'
This advice was echoed last year at an annual conference for
obstetricians and gynecologists when the director of risk management at the
University of Colorado Health Science Center advised doctors to
"apologize for what happened."' 40 When some members of the audience
argued against this advice because of the possibility that "apologizing
implies that you did something wrong," the director explained that "it's
how you go about it that matters.' 4' ASHRM warns that "[e]ach
organization, working with its attorneys and insurers, must decide if the
potential for a benevolent gesture being construed as an admission of
culpability 42outweighs the value of acknowledgment of patient/family
1
suffering."'
Advice like this from leaders in the health care industry shows that there
is indeed a shift from moral concerns to those focused on "strategic
maneuvers and legal consequences"' 4 3 for many of those drafting policies to
address the emerging duty to disclose unanticipated results. Yet this
movement is not limited to the health care industry; it is now accelerating
and is being reflected in an emerging area of law.
I introduce a legislative trend here because there are similarities between
laws that are being enacted to protect apologies and policies surrounding
the disclosure of medical error. These statutes, like some policies guiding
the execution of empathic disclosures, begin with good intentions yet
ultimately interrupt the moral dimension of apology. In the process, these
statutes erase the healing capability of apology. This is a development that
should alarm anyone interested in the moral dimension of apologetic
discourse and its healing possibilities.
The trend began in 1986 when the Massachusetts legislature created a
"safe harbor" provision for would-be apologizers.144 This statute provides:

138.
139.
140.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Heidi Splete, Recognize Risk Management Strategies to Avoid Losing Lawsuits, 33

FAM. PRAC. NEWS 44 (2003).

141.
142.
143.

Id.
ASHRM I, supra note 10, at 8.
Levi, supra note 136, at 1188.

144.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 233 § 23D (2000).
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Statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a
general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a
person involved in an accident and made to such person or to the family
of such person shall be 45inadmissible as evidence of an admission of
liability in a civil action.
The statute was created after a Massachusetts legislator's daughter was
killed while riding her bicycle. 146 The driver of the automobile that struck
her never apologized. 147 Her father, angry at the lack of contrition, was told
that the driver dared not risk apologizing because of the potential legal
consequences attached to an admission. 48 Rather than being incensed at
the driver's lack of moral courage, the senator and his successor erected a
legislative screen intended to promote apology.149
There was no
consideration given to the moral implications of this "protected apology"
within the broader context of apologetic
discourse by either of these men or
50
the Massachusetts legislature.
This Massachusetts statute was the only one of its kind until 1999 when151
a
Texas lawyer, visiting Massachusetts, heard about the Massachusetts law.
When he returned to Texas, he encouraged a Texas legislator to create a law
following the Massachusetts example. 52 The Texas law, dubbed by the
Austin American Statesman as the "I'm sorry" bill, is similar to the
Massachusetts law except in one important respect. 153 In Texas, the statute
does not protect "a statement ... concerning negligence or culpable

conduct .... This means that in Texas the expression of regret, like the
empathic disclosures described above, are protected, while an admission of
wrongdoing, as is required by authentic apology, is not. Like the
Massachusetts legislators, the lawmakers in Texas enacted this law without
regard to its moral implications. 5 5 And, unfortunately, the Texas statute
has proven to be the model for other states, including California.'5 6
According to its sponsor, Judge Quentin Kopp, the California statute was

145. Id.
146. Taft, supra note 22, at 1151.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 1151 n.82.
151. Id. at 1153 n.93.
152. Taft, supra note 22, at 1153 n.93.
153. Id. at 1152.
154. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Supp. 2004-05).
155. See Taft, supra note 22, at 1153 n.93.
156. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (Supp. 2004); FL. STAT. ANN. Ch. 90.4026 (Supp.
2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010(1) (2004).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol14/iss1/4

22

Taft: Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?

2005]

Apology and Medical Mistake

designed to address the many ("although unquantifiable") lawsuits that are
filed as a result of anger. 57 Kopp attributed this anger to the "failure of
another party to express regret or sympathy."' 5 8 In support of the statute, he
noted that an "apology is underrated and underused as a tool in legal
settings... too often overlooked.., as a lubricant to advance settlement
talks. . . .""9 Kopp cited anecdotal evidence that "30 percent of plaintiffs
claim no suit would have occurred if a medical doctor in a medical
malpractice context had apologized."'' 60 He concluded his commentary
with specific examples that "may be helpful to the [Assembly] Committee
[on Judiciary] in understanding the parameters of the bill's proposed new
evidence rule."' 16 1 His examples help us see the human toll when there is a
shift away from moral concerns toward utilitarian and strategic goals.
In his first example, "an automobile accident occurs and one driver says
to the other: 'I'm sorry you were hurt,' -or- 'I'm sorry that your car was
damaged.' Under the bill, these statements would not be admissible in
court.' ' 162 In the second example,
[t]he same accident occurs, and one driver says to the other: 'I'm sorry
you were hurt, the accident was all my fault.' -or- 'I'm sorry you were
hurt, I was using my cell phone and just didn't see you coming.' Under
the bill, only the portions of the statement containing the apology would
be inadmissible; any other expression acknowledging or implying fault
would continue to be admissible, consistent with present evidentiary
standards. 163
It is clear from this commentary that Kopp does not appreciate the
distinctions between expressions of sympathy and authentic apology, either
Had he considered the practical
in theoretical or practical terms.
implementation of the kind of apology he supported, Kopp would have seen
that what was theoretically thought to help caused harm in praxis. He
simply failed to translate his example into the real life experience of this
theoretical victim (or into the life experience of a patient who is harmed by
medical error). To test the theory, the actual result of the hypothetical must
be considered. Was it a fender bender? Was there a loss of life? If you had
lost your leg or your sight or your spouse or your child because someone
was using his or her cell phone, would it assuage your anger if he or she
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (2004 Electronic Update Comment).

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (2004 Electronic Update Comment).
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said only, "I'm sorry you were hurt" or "I'm sorry you lost your husband"
or "I'm sorry your child can no longer see?" Would that "apology" help
you heal
even if you could admit the portion of the statement as evidence of
164
fault?
When Hilfiker excepted doctors from the healing dimension of apology
he did so because of his perspective that mistakes in the medical arena are
different from those made by others because "[a] doctor's miscalculation or
oversight can prolong an illness or cause a permanent disability, or kill a
patient."1 65 His statement shows that it is not the mistake itself that makes
authentic apology so complex in the medical arena, but rather the severity
of the outcome that results from the mistake that makes it so hard for a
doctor to admit wrongdoing. If I run a red light and hit an unattended
grocery cart left in the intersection, will it be so difficult for me to admit my
error to the owner of the cart that I remain silent? What if I run that same
light and, rather than a cart, I strike and kill a human being? How will the
difference in result effect what it is I communicate? Thinking this way
illustrates that it is not the mistake itself that166makes authentic apology so
difficult, but rather the gravity of its outcome.
When there is a small event, insignificant in terms of harm caused,
statutes like those in Texas and California and disclosures like those
suggested by the American Society for Healthcare Risk Management
(ASHRM), which encourage expressions of sympathy, may be efficacious,
at least for the kind of people who, while not seriously harmed, expect the
167
courtesy the "protected apology" and the empathic disclosure encourage.
Yet when an unanticipated outcome causes serious injury, the permanent
kinds of injury Hilfiker describes, empathic disclosures must be seen as
"protected apologies" like those the California statute promotes. These

164. In contemplating this series of questions, recall the findings of Lazare and
Robbennolt. See supranotes 84, 119 and accompanying text.
165. Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 328. As I note in the balance of this paragraph and the
following note, it is not only the severity of the outcome that makes apology different for
doctors. Another factor, and one I think of more significance, is the constancy of the risk of
causing harm, the hourly experience that a misstep can lead to a harmful, unanticipated
result.
166. This is to say that the feeling of remorse tied to actual harm caused is different
from a feeling tied to the possibility that harm could have resulted from one's behavior. The
JCAHO standard requires the disclosure of all unanticipated outcomes, yet it is the harmful
outcome that is much more difficult to disclose. Legal philosopher Jeffrie Murphy makes
this point clear when he notes that it is not the violation of an authoritative prohibition alone
that fuels the intense experience of guilt; rather "[w]e typically feel our most intense guilts,
not because of abstract and formal violations of authoritative rules, but because we see
vividly the harm we have inflicted on others by such violations." Jeffrie G. Murphy, Shame
Creeps Through Guilt and Feels Like Retribution, 18 LAW & PHIL. 327, 332 (1999).
167. Robbennolt, supra note 84, at 498.
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gestures--empathic disclosures and protected apologies--encourage half
measures similar to the "botched apology." And, like the "botched
apology," these kinds of gestures must ultimately be seen as expressions
that cause more harm than good, or worse. As Lazare notes, "botched
than assuage the anger the
apologies" can fuel bitter vengeance rather 168
gesture was strategically designed to alleviate.
I oppose these kinds of protected apologies, at least in the context of
serious and meaningful injury. Their sponsors fail to see the wisdom of the
evidentiary rule. The rule makes the expression of apology much more
difficult because it takes great courage to accept responsibility in the face of
great loss. For some, the rule may totally interrupt the moral inclination to
confess. Yet it is precisely because the rule demands so much that it must
ultimately be seen as a safeguard of the moral integrity of authentic
apology.
There is no ethical or regulatory requirement that authentic apology be
included in disclosure. Ethical and regulatory standards of disclosure
require only that the patient is told that harm has occurred and is given
sufficient information to make an informed decision regarding his or her
health care. 169 There is no external legal or regulatory requirement that
compels a doctor to confess wrong conduct or risk being placed in legal
jeopardy. Authentic apology is reserved for the morally courageous who
seek for themselves and their patients the deep healing authentic apology
inspires. When authentic apology is shrouded with legal protection or
communicated through strategic and defensive mechanisms, and moral
concerns give way to worry about legal consequences, the moral dimension
of apology is170potentially totally subverted. This is what happened last year
in Colorado.
A Colorado statute shows what happens when perceived utility eclipses
considerations of morality. 71 The Colorado legislature was interested in
granting blanket immunity regarding the expression of apology to one class
of people: health care providers and their employees.172 This statute,
shocking both in its breadth and in its one-sidedness, declares that:
[A]ll statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apology,
fault, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general
sense of benevolence which are made by a health care provider or an
168. See Lazare, supra note 119, at 40.
implications of anger in malpractice cases).
169. See supra pp. 59-60, 67-70.

See also infra pp. 53-55 (discussing the

170.

CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135 (2003).

171.
172.

Id.
Id.
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employee of a health care provider to the alleged victim, a relative of the

alleged victim, or a representative of the alleged victim and which relate
to the discomfort, pain, suffering, injury, or death, or the alleged victim
as the result of the unanticipated outcome of medical care shall be
inadmissible as evidence of173an admission of liability or as evidence of an
admission against interest.
This is precisely the kind of statute some legal scholars have proposed.
Those who see value in this kind of law argue that it disrupts "the law of the
sandbox," a law with a voice saying, "Ha, ha, you said it, now you're stuck
with your own admission."' 174 The argument is disingenuous in that even
though the proponents of this kind of statute understand that its one-sided
protection is potentially unfair, they encourage its enactment. 175 They do so
despite the fact that a statute like this exacerbates the very injury the
"apology" is designed to heal.
I will leave for another essay a critique of the Colorado legislators'
choice to protect only one category of people from the consequences of
their admissions. There, I will examine the logic that leads a legislative
body to determine that a health care provider is more deserving of
protection from the consequences of an admission than is a truck driver or a
lawyer or a bishop. Here I will focus on the moral implication of this
statute and show how the moral dimension of authentic apology is
corrupted by its application. This becomes clear when a theoretical idea is
transcribed into a practical context, just as the California statute was when
placed in reality's harsh light.
Consider a case where a two-year-old child with glaucoma is undergoing
a routine procedure to check his eye pressure under anesthesia. The
anesthesia is being administered by a resident under the supervision of a
board-certified anesthesiologist. After the initial induction, the supervisor
leaves the operating suite to grab a quick cup of coffee. The resident
inadvertently administers curare 176 because the vials on her cart were not
color-coded or otherwise clearly marked. The resident fails to notice the
child's distress, which continues until the opthamologist conducting the
examination realizes the child is in complete cardiac arrest. Although
eventually resuscitated, the child suffers permanent brain injury. If you
were the supervising anesthesiologist, what would you say to the child's
parents?

173.
174.

Id.
Orenstein, supra note 69, at 249.

175. E.g., id. at 255.
176. Curare is an extract used to relax muscles.
DICTIONARY 283 (10th ed. 1996).
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Under the Colorado statute, the physician would be free of all concerns
that are normally present in disclosing to the patient and the patient's family
an unanticipated, adverse outcome. One could tell the parents precisely
what happened and offer an apology minus, of course, the dimension of
authenticity that requires the person apologizing to risk potential
consequences that would normally flow from the admission. The statute
allows one to say with full immunity:
I am so sorry for what occurred, I was supposed to be supervising the
administration of the drugs, but left to grab a cup of coffee. I intended to
be gone only a minute but received a call on my cell phone. By the time
I returned, your child was already in arrest, but I participated in his
resuscitation. The error is my fault and would not have happened had I
stayed in the operating room. In leaving, I violated hospital policies and
procedures. This was wrong and I am so sorry. I promise to see that you
are fairly compensated.
If the promise is fulfilled, then the moral dilemma I raise here is avoided.
This is because the physician or health care provider is acting with integrity
and abandons the temptation to accept the subversion the statute allows. In
fulfilling the promise made, there is moral integrity and the restoration I
have described is complete. In keeping the promise, accepting the
consequences of the error and waiving the immunity the statute allows, the
apology proffered becomes authentic and promotes the healing that flows to
both patient and physician. But what if the promise is not fulfilled? What
if the doctor recants either of her own volition or because of institutional
pressures?
Those who recognize this potential acknowledge that the effect of the
statute-its protection of the entire discourse from the jury's
consideration-may be problematic for the plaintiff. After all, it would be
"maddening" to hear the doctor "deny in [open] court what [she] admitted
in an apology. ' 7 7 Yet, the proponents of these blanket protections argue
that "the plaintiff on balance is better off.' 78 How are the parents of this
brain-damaged child "better off?" Would you be better off if you had to
prove in court what your doctor had already admitted? Would those
protected words help you heal? And what if you were the anesthesiologist
in this example? How would you feel knowing that what you said had only
the appearance of authenticity, that there was no possibility of the
admission leading to consequence? How would this distort your moral
compass? Would this expression help you heal? Is this the kind of
177.
178.

Orenstein, supra note 69, at 255.
Id.
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confession Hilfiker imagined?
We can do better than this. The subversion the Colorado statute
promotes is not what either patients or physicians desire. I spoke recently
at an ethical forum before a large group of health care providers at
Children's Medical Center in Dallas. These dedicated professionals taught
me in a candid setting what journals have long reported: "[p]hysicians want
to apologize to patients when harmful medical errors occur" but their moral
inclination is constantly challenged and often trumped by the real and
perceived fear of the consequences that result from confession. 17 9
Encouraging cultural shifts away from "moral concerns to strategic
maneuvers and legal consequences" results in human cost in terms of the
lost opportunity for healing. 180 These kinds of movements can be seen
subtly in "well-crafted expressions of sympathy" as well as in blatant and
offensive expressions like the Colorado statute. 181 It begins when a
communication designed to promote healing becomes distorted by strategic
and legal maneuvers that cause more harm than good, piling suffering on
top of suffering. This movement must be interrupted, but to do so will take
a pioneering spirit and great courage from those in the health care industry.
VI. OVERCOMING FEAR: OPPORTUNITIES

In spite of statistical data showing that only a fraction of those who
suffer injury file suit,' 82 fear of litigation continues to be the primary

179.

Carol M. Ostrom, MalpracticeBill Would Require Disclosure of Medical Errors,

SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004, at

B2.

180.

Levi, supra note 136, at 1188.

181.

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135.

182. See Wendy Levinson, Physician-Patient Communication: A Key to Malpractice
Prevention, 272 JAMA 1619, 1620 (1994). Statistical data is not particularly reliable in
quantifying the number of claims made because the numbers presented vary depending on
who is doing the reporting and how the numbers are interpreted. In 1994, it was reported
that there were eight times as many instances of negligence as claims for compensation and
only a one in fifty chance of a doctor being sued. Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue
Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1609
(June 25, 1994). This year it is reported that the American Medical Association found that
one in six physicians face a medical claim each year. Adam Scham, Sick System: Adam
Scharn Makes a Case for Malpractice Lawsuit Reform, BATTALLION, Aug. 25, 2004,
http:www.thebattallion.com/news/2004/08/25/Opinion/Sick-Systemavailable
at
704655.shtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2004). The Insurance Information Institute reports that
claims are growing at the rate of 3% per year. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Medical
Malpractice, November 2004, available at http://iiidev.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/
medicalmal/?printerfriendly=yes (last visited Nov. 19, 2004). Conversely, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners found that the number of malpractice claims
actually dropped between 1995 and 2000. DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITrEE, Myths and
Facts About Medical Malpractice, available at http://democtrats.senate.gov/-dpc/pubs/108-

1-023.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2004). Others say it is not even medical malpractice claims
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impediment to the performance of authentic apology. 183 This fear leads to
defensive and strategic disclosure practices and legislative initiatives such
as those examined in this essay. It is this fear that overrides welldocumented studies that repeatedly state that authentic apology is what both
patients and physicians want.' 84 It is this fear that continues to be "the most
commonly cited institutional barrier to developing and implementing
disclosure policies.' 8 5
Medical journals and publications are replete with examples that should
undercut this fear. One illustration is the well-documented success of the
Veteran's Administration hospital (VA) in Lexington, Kentucky. 8 6 After
experiencing costly, back-to-back malpractice cases, the hospital enacted a
proactive disclosure policy.' 87 This policy required investigation of all
cases that could result in litigation. 188 During the course of one such
investigation, the risk management committee discovered an error that was
unknown to the patient. 89 This proved to be a decisive moment in defining
that institution's integrity; the committee not only disclosed the error to the
patient, but also accepted responsibility for the adverse outcome.190
In a recent article, Dr. Steve S. Kraman, the medical director of the
Lexington VA, and Ginny Hamm, the Lexington VA's in-house lawyer,
outline the key components in the Lexington VA's disclosure policy: (1)
risk management identifies "an instance of accident, possible negligence, or
malpractice;" (2) the patient is notified that "there was a problem with the

that pose the most significant legal and financial risk to hospitals: "it is more likely for a
hospital to face a multi-million dollar fraud settlement with the government than face a
similarly large settlement in a medical malpractice case." Susan Huntington, FraudProbe
Raises New MalpracticeRisks, 105 ERLANGER 13, 14 (Jan. 8, 2001). In investigating the
rapid rise of malpractice insurance premiums, the United States Government Accounting
Office recently concluded that any analysis of the issue is necessarily incomplete because of
"a lack of comprehensive data at the national and state levels on insurers' medical

malpractice claims and the associated losses."

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS
HEALTHCARE 9, GAO-03-836 (Aug. 2003).

OF RISING

PREMIUMS

ON ACCESS TO

183. E.g., Gallagher et al., supra note 85, at 1006.
184. Id.
185. Lamb et al., supra note 9, at 76.
186. See, e.g., Maureen Glabman, The Top Ten Hospital MalpracticeClaims-And How
to Minimize Them, 57 TRUSTEE 12, 15 (2004); Owning Up to Errors Saves Money, 30
NURSING 53, 53 (2000) [hereinafter Owning Up to Errors]; Steven S. Kraman & Ginny
Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED.

963, 964 (1999).

187. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 186, at 964.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 186, at 964; Albert W. Wu, Handling Hospital
Errors:Is Disclosurethe Best Defense?, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 970, 971 (1999).
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care" received and is invited to come to the hospital; (3) a face-to-face
meeting is conducted; and (4) the hospital offers continuing assistance to
the patient in obtaining compensation.19'
The details of the error are not outlined in the preliminary call to the
patient, but the patient is given enough information "to indicate the
seriousness of the matter (including, if necessary, a statement that a medical
mistake was made and that an attorney may accompany the patient or
family if desired)." ' 92 The heart of the disclosure occurs at the actual
meeting when the hospital, through its chief of staff, expresses regret,
details corrective action taken to prevent other similar occurrences, and
extends an offer of restitution. 93 The VA considers restitution in broad
terms which cover corrective medical procedures, assistance in filing for
194
governmental benefits (such as disability), and monetary compensation.
The patient is guided in filing all requisite forms for preserving their claim
and is advised to hire an attorney. 195 "The committee is then equally
forthcoming with the plaintiff's attorney .... 11196
This approach has reaped significant economic rewards. In 1999, the
median malpractice settlement in the private sector was $497,412 while
Lexington's was only $98,150.197 In a concentrated study that focused only
on the years 1990-1996, "the Lexington facility had 88 malpractice claims"
and paid an average of $15,622 per claim. 198 Additionally, only eight
claims were filed in court, seven of which were dismissed before trial,' 99
and the VA won the only case that proceeded to trial. 2 0 Before the
initiation of the policy, the Lexington VA was among the nation's VA
hospitals that paid the most in claims. 20 1 Now it is "among those that pay
the least. 20 2
The experience of the Lexington VA cuts against the kind of advice
limiting disclosure to empathic communications with patients where there is
no admission of wrongdoing. The VA disclosure practice fulfills the
191. Kraman & Harem, supra note 186, at 966-67.
192. Id. at 967.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Steve S. Kraman, Lexington VA HospitalProvides a Model of Patient Disclosure,
3d Annenberg Conference on Patient Safety (May 17, 2001), available at
http://www.npsf.org/congress_archive/2001/summary thursday.html.
198. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 186, at 964.
199. Id.
200. See id
201. Owning Up to Errors,supra note 186, at 53.
202. Id.
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elements, of repentance to which authentic apology gives voice: it
acknowledges wrongdoing through recognition of negligent treatment,
expresses remorse and offers to make restitution. The final element of
repentance, which requires restructuring of a life, is also borne out by the
VA's experience: the rigorous honesty of its policy encourages systemic
change. Discussing errors openly creates educational opportunities that
help others avoid similar mistakes in the future.2 °3 The VA example
establishes that risking authentic apology is efficacious not only from a
moral perspective, but also from a practical analysis. Yet even this policy
misses a critical opportunity. By having someone other than the physician
who made the error communicate the disclosure, the opportunity for
spiritual healing for both patient and physician is lost. 2°4 Still, this policy is
as close to an authentic disclosure as I have found.
Some caution that the VA experience should not be relied upon in a
private setting.2 °5 After all, the VA serves a specific patient population of
"mainly older men of limited means, a group that may have finite
expectations and a low level of litigiousness. 20 6 Additionally, VA
"physicians are [legally] protected from personal liability and are not named
[as parties] in malpractice [cases]., 20 7 The success of the policy itself is
counterintuitive: it is one that increases the number of malpractice suits yet
decreases the amount paid out. This is a "rare solution that is both ethically
correct and cost-effective. 20 8
Yet, the VA is not the only example illustrating that truth-telling and
accountability can be both morally and practically beneficial, as there is
other evidence to support authentic disclosures like that of the VA. For
example, it has recently been reported that the Dana Farber Cancer Institute,
a private facility in Boston, has not seen an increase in litigation in spite of
its proactive disclosure policies. 20 9 Additionally, doctors in hospitals in the
University of Michigan Health System have been encouraged to apologize
for mistakes since 2002 and, as a result, notices of intent to sue have fallen
203. For further discussion on the impact of openness in avoiding future errors, see infra
note 217.
204. See JCAHO II, supra note 8, at Standard RI.2.90. It may also be out of step with
the JCAHO requirement that the responsible care provider must inform the patient.
205. See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 186, at 966 (discussing the difference between
claims in the public and private sector). See also Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and
Organizations: Exploring An Example from Medical Malpractice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1447, 1455 (2000) (noting important differences between physicians in the private sector
from those practicing in a federal governmental context).
206. Wu, supra note 190, at 971.
207. Id.
208. Id.at 972.
209. See Lamb et al., supra note 9, at 80.
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from 262 in 2001 to approximately 130 per year. 2
Another -anecdotal
example is one recently reported by the American Society for Healthcare
Risk Management (ASHRM). 211

In its Monograph on disclosure, ASHRM reviews the results of research
centered on an actual suit that resulted in a multi-million dollar plaintiffs
verdict. 2 12 In that study, two mock trials were conducted before two mock
juries.213 In one of the mock trials, the jury was presented with the exact
fact pattern as it had occurred in the original trial.2 14 The second mock trial
was identical, except a mock disclosure was added to the factual scenario
presented.21 5 The disclosure proved determinative in the verdicts.21 6
The first mock jury returned a verdict almost identical to that of the
original jury trial. "By contrast, the jury where there was disclosure granted
an award that was millions of dollars lower., 217 When the researchers
debriefed the mock jurors, they learned that the failure to disclose the error
"exacerbated the belief that the organization should be punished for more
than compensable real damages. 218 Yet, when the jurors were advised of
the disclosure, their inclination to punish evaporated so that the jurors "felt
their duty was only to compensate for genuine losses. 219
210.

Doctors: Just Say Sorry, TRAVERSE CiTy RECORD-EAGLE, Nov. 12, 2004, at 6A.
211. ASHRM I, supra note 10, at 6.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. ASHRM I, supra note 10, at 6.
218. Id.
219. See id.But see, Brian H. Bornstein et al., The Effects of Defendant Remorse on
Mock JurorDecisionsin a MalpracticeCase, 20 BEHAV. Sci. LAw 393 (2002). In this study,
the authors identified what they described as four apology strategies: remorse, responsibility,
forbearance, and reparation. Id.at 394. They then measured only the way in which the
expression of remorse affected mock juror decisions. In their conclusions they mistakenly
conflated the expression of remorse with apology concluding that "apologizing at the time
the adverse event occurs leads to higher damage awards than not apologizing, especially
when the injury is relatively severe." Id.at 407. They close with a caveat: "defendant
physicians must unfortunately be very guarded about when and how they display remorse for
a patient's negative outcome." Id.at 408. The conclusion and caveat seem precipitous,
especially when it is recalled that the expression of remorse alone is tantamount to a botched
apology. See supra pp. 70-72. Had the authors understood the expression of remorse alone
as a "botched apology" then the results of the decision of the mock jurors would have been
an expected hypothesis rather than the apparent surprise it was. The authors seem to
recognize the limitation of their findings in their suggestion of the need for future research.
Bomstein, supra, at 407. What is not clear, is whether they understand the specific reason
that would explain the mock jurors decision. As the VA example makes clear, a fair offer of
compensation must accompany the apology. See supra pp. 82-84; cf Robbennolt, supra
note 84, at 504 (recognizing the significance of the offer of compensation in conjunction
with the full apology in promoting settlement).
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The importance of disclosure to the jury's decision in the mock trials
echoes the actual experience of Lexington's VA. When asked why the
value of their claims was lower than other veteran hospitals, Dr. Kraman
responded that "the reason our payout is lower is due to honesty. 2 2 °
Elaborating, he noted that what patients want first are facts,
22 second an
apology, and, finally, money, "which comes in a distant third.", 1
In this essay I have demonstrated the moral value of authentic apology
and the way it inspires healing for both physician and patient. I have
shown, too, how the moral dimension of apology can be subverted when
strategic and legal concerns take precedence over moral and ethical
movements. This is what happens when empathic disclosures are offered in
lieu of authentic expressions of remorse and when misguided legislatures
enact laws that "protect" apology and, in the process, legislate away the
expression's central element. Some disclosures, like the "protected"
apology, are actually "botched apologies" that harm instead of heal.
The examples in this section support the second prong of my thesis: in
addition to its moral and healing dimension, full disclosure coupled with
authentic apology also has quantitative benefits that outweigh the real and
perceived risks in its communication.22 2 Still, the resistance to full
disclosure persists. How can it be that physicians and institutions recognize
that apology carries with it both moral and practical benefits, yet continue
to allow fear of litigation to be the overarching concern in constructing
disclosure policies? 223
Perhaps one physician's candid comment

220. Carol Patton, Physicians Wary of JCAHO Rules on Medical Errors, PHYSIcIANS
FIN. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2001, available at http://www.doctorquality.com/www/news/
news 091501.htm.
221. Id.
222. Another practical benefit of institutional support for authentic apology is the
expectation that the movement toward a culture of honesty and openness will disrupt those
cultures of silence that tend to hide systemic problems that may have contributed to the error.
Recall that repentance requires, as one of its essential elements, the restructuring of life. See
supra p. 13. In the context of medical error, this requires a willingness to learn from the
mistake and effect changes in order to ensure that a similar mistake is not repeated. The
benefit to hospitals that risk honesty and a willingness to change is particularly significant
when the cost of individual error is considered as a cumulative expense within the
institutional context. See Cohen, supra note 205, at 1464-68 (explaining that in the context
of medical error, this requires a willingness to learn from the mistake and effect changes in
order to ensure that a similar mistake is not repeated. The benefit to hospitals that risk
honesty and a willingness to change is particularly significant when the cost of individual
error is considered as a cumulative expense within the institutional context).
223. See Gallagher et al., supra note 85, at 1006. The authors of this study concluded
that the current response to medical errors was inadequate in meeting the needs of patients
and physicians. "Patients unanimously wanted information regarding an error's cause,
consequences, and future prevention." Id. Yet, fear of litigation led to a discomfort for
physicians to disclose and interrupted an inclination to apologize. Id.
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illuminates what propels this paradox:
Everything you read and everything that you're told says that you are
supposed to tell what errors you make as soon as you can. Let them
know what your thinking is, what you are going to do about it. And your
chances of having an adverse litigation are less if you take that approach.
Now the question is, how many of us believe that?
The answer to this rhetorical question is not nearly enough. This is a
systemic issue, one that threatens to undermine the opportunities created by
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report and the regulatory responses to it.
While more than eighty percent of hospitals responding to a recent survey
indicated that disclosure policies were in place or being developed, the most
recent reports acknowledge that "there is still a long way to go before
serious harm is consistently and thoroughly disclosed to patients., 225 The
rhetorical question the doctor poses leaves me wondering if the insights I
have offered to this point are enough to resolve the intolerable dilemma
Hilfiker noted: when one sees the horror of his or her mistake yet is
systemically constrained from initiating steps to alleviate the suffering
caused by the mistake. Is the proof of my thesis enough to tip the scales of
reason against perceptions fueled by fear?
I will make one last argument in my attempt to encourage a cultural shift
that brings medical mistakes into the open through proactive disclosures
that include authentic apology, one final attempt to tip the scales toward
moral concerns and away from policies and practices that focus on strategic
and legal consequences. In this argument, I rely primarily on my expertise
as a trial lawyer, a role in which I was for many years board certified in
both personal injury and civil trial practice. Throughout my legal career, I
represented people who had suffered catastrophic loss, often as the result of
medical mistake. If it is the fear of litigation that stands between truth and
healing, if it is fear that interrupts Hilfiker's formula of confession leading
to absolution, then that fear must be addressed head-on.
Recent studies have reported that "perceptions about [the] litigation risk
may be worse than the reality. 226 Regardless of the truth of this claim,
malpractice litigation is real and, if you are the one sued, litigation is a
grueling, life-altering experience. It extracts great costs in both economic
and non-monetary terms. The plaintiffs recovery is only one element of
the economic costs, as money also pours out for lawyers, expert witnesses,
and travel. The Lexington VA's lawyer reports that it costs $250,000 to
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defend a single malpractice case. 2 27 There is a financial cost to the
physician regardless of whether or not malpractice insurance is in place.
There are deductibles to pay and lost income due to the time litigation
requires the physician to spend away from the practice of medicine. There
are non-economic costs as well.
In the past fifteen years, there have been reports on the effects of mistake
on physicians. Hilfiker's essay offers anecdotal evidence, while more
recent reports are based on actual studies performed. All agree that the
emotional impact of mistake on the health care professional is dramatic.
Studies show that in the aftermath of error, "[p]rofessionals often feel
shame, humiliation, agony, anguish, devastation, panic, guilt, remorse,
sadness, anger, self-doubt, and self-blame. 2 28 In addition, doctors' need to
satisfy professional and cultural expectations of perfectionism leads to
breaches in integrity-cover-ups, record changing, and other forms of
dishonesty. 229 In the present culture, mistakes fuel isolation, addiction, and
suicide.23 ° While "patients are the first and obvious victims of medical
are wounded by the same errors: they are the second
mistakes,23doctors
1
victims."
It is widely believed among physicians that plaintiffs' lawyers constantly
seek inventive ways to bring lawsuits and, in the hunt for cases, these
lawyers fail to be sufficiently discriminating when accepting cases. I do not
doubt that there are some plaintiffs' lawyers who operate precisely in this
way. All negative stereotypes have some small measure of truth. Yet when
translated into a business model, the impression of the way cases are
selected does not make economic sense.
In any medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove by the greater
weight of the credible evidence that the physician's care fell below the
standard of practice. This is no easy burden. To satisfy this requires the
testimony of physicians from within the defendant doctor's field of
specialty. Finding such an expert is difficult, the fees charged by experts
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229. See Berkeley Rice, How Plaintiff'Lawyers Pick Their Targets, 77 MED. EcON. 94
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230. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical
Malpractice Claims FollowingPerinatalInjuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1359 (1992); Gallagher
et al., supra note 85, at 1005. As I was completing this essay, The Dallas Morning News
reported the suicide of Dr. Philip Adam Ticktin. See Joe Simnacher, Doctor Loved Pace of
Working in ER, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 12, 2004, at B7. According to the article, Dr.
Ticktin "was upset about a recently settled medical malpractice lawsuit and a second lawsuit
that was related to the first ....
Id.
231. Wu, supra note 129, at 726.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2005

35

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 14

are enormous, and, like all costs associated with the malpractice case,
experts' fees are typically paid by the plaintiffs lawyer as the case
progresses. It is not uncommon for a plaintiffs lawyer to have costs
advanced in a six-figure range, costs that do not include a fee that is
contingent on the plaintiffs lawyer winning the case. The successful
plaintiffs lawyer cannot afford to be careless in case selection. On the
contrary, the careful plaintiffs lawyer is looking for the egregious case, one
Many malpractice lawyers share this
likely to incite a jury.
perspective.Jeffrey Allen and Alice Burkin are "experts at suing doctors. 23 2
They underscore the difficulty of prevailing in a medical malpractice case
when they offer this reminder: "[n]ever forget that you're asking [twelve]
people to take money from one person and give it to another., 233 One of the
key strategies they look for to convince this panel of twelve to take money
from doctors and give it to their clients is an "incendiary device"something that will get the jurors angry at the doctor. 3 This is because an
angry jury awards more money, just as the mock jury did in the ASHRM
study reported earlier. 235 Allen and Burkin's favorite "incendiary device" is
the arrogant physician who "just can't.., admit that [he or she has]
screwed up, even when it's obvious. 2 36
There is a systemic way to remove this incendiary device and disable its
potential for explosive impact. That way is to create a disclosure policy
like that modeled by the Lexington VA, but that also provides an
opportunity for healing as I have outlined. 237 Under a best-case scenario,
after this fault-admitting disclosure, the parties will, in most cases, resolve
the matter expeditiously, as the Lexington experience has proved over and
over during the past fifteen years. 238 Still, it is the worst-case scenariowhere the case cannot be quickly resolved and proceeds to trial-that fuels
the fear which interrupts the inclination to risk the opportunity authentic
apology presents. Yet even when the case does not settle, the health care
provider will be better off for risking what authenticity requires.
If the case proceeds to trial the admission can be used defensively in at
least two different ways. In many states, trials can be bifurcated, that is,
split so that issues of liability and damages are considered separately. In
the face of an authentic apology, there is no reason to try the issue of fault
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since it has already been admitted. Because of the admission created by the
apology, the defense would accept liability and allow the case to proceed on
damages alone.
This keeps the jury focused on its central taskdetermining fair compensation for the injured party. In advising the jury
that the doctor has admitted having made a mistake and has accepted
responsibility, the skillful defense lawyer can communicate what the case is
really about: money. This creates a complication for the plaintiffs lawyer:
without the "incendiary device" the denial of clear liability creates, the issue
of compensation takes center stage, so much so that the plaintiff must be
cautious or risk that his demand for compensation be seen as greed instead.
In those states where bifurcation is not allowed, the jury should be
advised from the beginning of the trial that this is not a case about faultfinding, but about the value to be assigned to the admitted mistake. Again,
a skilled defense lawyer can create a tension in this trial between fair
compensation and greed. For example, the trial can begin with a theme that
informs the jury that its only job is to determine a fair value for the injuries
the plaintiff sustained, since "Dr. Jones has apologized to Mr. Smith and
has expressed his remorse. In accepting fault, we ask only for your help in
determining fair compensation, the only issue we have not been able to
agree upon."
Of course there is the possibility for this process to be subverted, for the
authentic apology to become merely a "legal tool" or "lubricant" to
facilitate a rapid disposition of the suit. It is this subversive use of apology
that is advanced by many of the proponents of "protected" apologies.23 9
Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions, the general rule prevails so that the
opportunity for subversion is remote and unlikely.240 After all, how many
doctors in states other than Colorado would risk the consequences of a
fault-admitting disclosure in an attempt to manipulate litigation?
My suggestion for authentic apology as an integral piece of disclosure
practices when medical error is present is not one that I expect to be
immediately embraced by members of the health care industry or their
advisors. After all, if a national trend emerged along the lines suggested by
the success of pioneers like the Lexington VA, some businesses that make
239. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (2004 Electronic Update Comment) (noting bill's
sponsor argued in favor of the utility of apology without recognizing the moral implications
of legislatively protecting apology). See also Orenstein, supra note 69, at 255 (arguing in
favor of legislative protection in spite of realization that protection could be disruptive to
injured party).
240. To date, Colorado is the only state to legislatively protect the authentic apology.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135. The other states that have enacted legislation protect only
the expression of sympathy, not the admission central to an authentic apology. See, e.g.,
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1160; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.4026 (2004); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 18.061; WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010(1).
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money from both the fear of litigation and the litigation itself, such as
insurers and their lawyers, could be at risk. While I maintain professional
respect for most of the defense lawyers with whom I have worked, some
have engaged in legal maneuvers and tactics that appeared to be motivated
more by the chance to increase hourly billing than by advancing their
clients' best interests. It must be remembered that if there is a quick and
prompt settlement, defense firms stand to suffer economically. What is a
$250,000 cost from the health care provider's perspective is $250,000 in
income from the vantage point of their lawyers.
VII. CONCLUSION
This is a critical time for those in the health care industry. It is a time of
opportunity. It is not hyperbole to say this moment is just as important to
the health care industry as was the moment when a team of risk managers
sitting in Lexington, Kentucky decided to disclose "an incident of
negligence of which the patient or next of kin was apparently unaware. 24 1
Recall that the Kentucky team that made this decision was formed "to better
prepare the risk management committee to defend malpractice
claims .... ,242 It was in the face of an unexpected ethical dilemma that this
group of people and the institution it represented chose a risky and
courageous moral path. Just as that moment defined the integrity of a
particular hospital, so too will this moment define the moral integrity of
disclosure and its introduction into health care institutions across the nation.
How the health care industry chooses to respond will define the moral
relationship between institutions, physicians, and the people they serve for
the foreseeable future. If the choice is to disclose without an authentic
apology, my hope is that the disclosures made will avoid the confusion and
added suffering that result from well-crafted expressions of regret that do
not admit wrongdoing. To spend enormous energy and resources with
consultants and communication experts to craft self-serving disclosures that
are intended not only to inform but also to manipulate seems contrary to the
role of care-giver in a patient-centered environment. If there is an
unwillingness to accept the consequences of a wrongful act, integrity
requires that a disclosure not be conflated with apology through wellrehearsed and practiced communication strategies. That kind of disclosure
takes further advantage of the imbalance of power in the physician-patient
relationship. If moral courage fails and the decision is not to acknowledge
fault, integrity ought to be demonstrated in another manner. The physician
or health care provider should inform the patient of what happened and
"
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what will happen next, with courtesy and respect, but resist the urge to
employ the self-serving and defensive communication strategies of the
apologia.
For the courageous, the Lexington policy offers a good model, provided
it is modified as I have suggested.243 There should be an unequivocal
admission of error communicated by the physician or health care provider
responsible for the error, so the healing dimension of the authentic
expression of remorse can be fully experienced by patient and provider
alike. Should the patient refuse a fair offer of restitution, then let the trial
proceed. One will see that the authentic disclosure has the capacity to help
at trial as well. Defense lawyers and insurance carriers must also be
courageous. They must help construct a fair restitution package and refuse
to pay one dime to settle a frivolous suit. 244 Frivolous suits must be tried so
that the kind of lawyer who takes a case with an eye on an easy settlement
will become as anachronistic as an undisclosed medical error. A line needs
to be drawn and this is the time to set it down.
There is also a role for the legislature in this process. Rather than
enacting statutes that interrupt the integrity of apology, legislative bodies
should create laws that support, rather than undercut, the moral courage
required in fault-admitting statements.
In the context of disclosure
practices, this would be a law that conforms to the public policy supporting
the peaceful resolution of disputes, a policy that promotes settlements rather
than protracted litigation. In the face of the fault-admitting disclosure I
describe here, a statute should be drawn that is reciprocal in the way it
encourages both parties to be fair-minded so settlements are encouraged.
This law would inspire health care providers to be reasonable in the
restitution offered, yet restrain the human tendency to overstate the value of
one's loss. Such a statute would read:
In cases where a disclosure of an unanticipated outcome is made, in
which disclosure the health care provider acknowledges fault with
sufficient specificity so that the issue of negligence is removed from the
trier of fact's consideration, the health care provider shall submit in
writing an offer of restitution to the injured party or his or her
representative [within some reasonable time period from the date when
the injured party's losses can be measured]. The injured party will have
[some reasonable time period from the date the offer of restitution is
received] within which to accept or reject such offer of restitution. If the

243.

See supra pp. 79-83.

244. See Kraman, supra note 197. This is in conformance with the Lexington
experience. Dr. Kraman's advice is to offer fair settlements and "never settle nuisance
claims." Id.
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offer of restitution is rejected, and if a verdict falls within 12% of the
offer of restitution, then the injured party shall recover the amount
tendered in the offer of restitution or the verdict, whichever is less. In
addition, the injured party shall pay the reasonable litigation expenses
incurred by the health care provider between
the date of the offer of
245
restitution and the conclusion of the trial.
It will take years for a statute like this to be considered, and in that time
many more errors will undoubtedly occur and thousands of patients and
physicians will suffer as a result of medical mistakes. This essay is another
step in the emerging research that undercuts the kind of advice that silences
physicians in the face of their mistakes, advice that locks them within the
"intolerable dilemma" Hilfiker described where one sees their mistakes yet
feels powerless to address them.246 There is a way out of this dilemma. It
is not a path one takes alone, it is quintessentially relational. The path is as
Hilfiker described: one of confession, restitution and absolution.2 47 It is a
path I hope Hilfiker has found.

245. The model I propose requires resolution of certain details. For example, the date at
which the injured party's damages can be measured must be clarified. I would suggest that
the damages be measured on the date the injured party has reached a point of maximum
medical benefit, at which time the injured party's future has been more clearly revealed.
Resolving such questions will add important detail and dimension to the proposed statute.
246. Hilfiker, supra note 12, at 335.
247. Id.
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